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The Future of Sustainability Reporting as a Regulatory Mechanism 
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Abstract. Sustainability reporting is now a mainstream activity among large, global 
corporations. The majority of the largest corporations in the United States now pro-
duce sustainability reports, and several European countries either mandate corpora-
tions to produce some form of sustainability reports or are in serious consideration of 
such legislation. Although leading standards such as the Global Reporting Initiative 
have made significant advancements in setting out the types of information that cor-
porations should publicly disclose, mandatory sustainability reports will not work as 
an effective policy mechanism unless they are placed in a system that can effectively 
utilize the information and cause corporations to change their policies and practices. 
This brief essay provides an overview of the current sustainability reporting industry, 











 In discussions on how to encourage corporations to move towards practices 
and strategies consistent with sustainable economic development, a common mecha-
nism mentioned is transparency. Often, this is the default approach, as it allows great-
er flexibility for both corporations and the government. Transparency initiatives work 
to encourage (or pressure) corporations that can do more to do more (as opposed to 
command-and-control regulation where all corporations are held to the same stand-
ard). In addition, the performance objectives are allowed to evolve over time, which 
works towards continuous improvement and each corporation advancing towards 
those goals at a pace that is reasonable for that corporation. Transparency initiatives 
also work to reduce the government’s regulatory burden, as various stakeholder 
groups are empowered—through access to information—to hold corporations ac-
countable for their performance and to push for improvement.  
 In the area of sustainable development, the primary transparency mechanism is 
the use of sustainability reports. These are disclosures by corporations on how they 
manage the various issues related to sustainable economic development and on met-
rics designed to show their actual performance over time. Over eighty percent of the 
Global Fortune 250 now publish sustainability reports. Although reports meeting the 
requirements of leading standards on sustainability reports are voluntary, an increas-
ing number of countries are enacting legislation to require the disclosure on some of 
the metrics recommended by the most well-known reporting standards. For example, 
France, Denmark, and Sweden, all require some form of disclosure on social or envi-
ronmental issues (United Nations Environment Programme et al, 2010). 
 Despite the growing use of sustainability reports and the increased attention 
they are receiving from policy makers, there is significant debate on whether or not 
they actually push corporations to meaningfully improve their performance on sus-
tainability dimensions. At the time of this writing, Ioannou and Serafeim (2011) have 
published the only large-scale study to show that mandatory sustainability reporting 
causes corporations to adopt more environmentally and socially responsible practices 
and to improve on relevant performance measures. Of course, Ioannou and Serafeim’s 
results will not satisfy the critics that argue that sustainability reports can never push 
corporations to radically rethink their operations (and even existence) and move to-
wards sustainability in any meaningful way (Mitchell et al, 2012). Instead, sustaina-
bility reports can only operate within a “weak sustainability” vision, which “implies 
that capitalism may be restructured to cope with environmental problems without re-
quiring a total transformation of the political–economic system.” (Ihlen & Roper, 
forthcoming; see also, Luke, 2013). 
Even if we accept that sustainability reports can only work to push corpora-
tions towards “weak sustainability,” there is still significant doubt that current practic-
es can make significant progress towards that goal.   These critics argue that sustaina-
bility reports are not of use to those stakeholders that seek to hold corporations 
accountable for their actions. Instead, the incentives are for corporations to produce a 
“high volume and low quality of information,” which stakeholders find difficult to as-
sess in terms of veracity and completeness (Siebecker, 2009, p. 128). These concerns 
are consistent with the view by some that corporate social responsibility in general 
has been taken over by corporations as a managerial tool to manage risks and further 
marketing goals, as opposed to being responsive to stakeholder demands and incorpo-
rating sustainable development into company values and operations (Bondy et al, 
5 
 
2012). Mitchell et al (2012, p. 1062) state that “reporting can and has been used to 
capture and control sustainability discourses and to avoid or defer organizational 
change (maintain status quo).” In short, corporations dissemble by selectively and 
strategically disclosing information, directing stakeholder dialogues towards reputa-
tion and risk management goals rather than true stakeholder engagement, and decou-
pling the reporting process from the corporation’s strategic and operating decisions 
(Hess, 2008).  
To attempt to correct the problem of dissembling, many have suggested mak-
ing social reports mandatory. Although there has long been a debate over whether re-
ports should be mandatory or not (Hess, 2007), the recent trend is towards mandatory 
reporting in some form. For example, a recent report states:  
Instead of presenting mandatory and voluntary sustainability reporting 
as exclusive options, they are in fact highly complementary. Assuming 
a complementary relationship between mandatory and voluntary 
approaches, the challenge for governments then becomes to determine 
the appropriate minimum level of mandatory requirements. (United 
Nations Environment Programme et al, 2010: 8). 
 
 Overall, many questions remain over whether sustainability reports can mean-
ingfully push corporations towards making their operations more sustainable, and 
therefore be an effective regulatory mechanism. In short, we are in one of three possi-
ble situations. One, current practices are on a trajectory where sustainability reports 
support “small wins” (Mitchell et al, 2012, p. 1063) in the short term, but will eventu-
ally lead to meaningful change over time. Two, “small wins” are the best that sustain-
ability reports can deliver in changing corporate behavior. Three, corporations’ cur-
rent practices work only work to enable corporations to manage risk and forestall any 
real progress towards change.  
To understand the ability of sustainability reports to push corporations towards 
sustainable development in the long-term (scenario one above)—whether in the cur-
rent primarily voluntary approach or with the increasing mandatory requirements—it 
is important to understand the system surrounding sustainability reports. The simple 
story of transparency initiatives is that disclosure by corporations will empower 
stakeholders to push for changes in corporate practices. However, there are a signifi-
cant number of steps that need to occur before that simple story can be enacted, and a 
breakdown at any step can prevent meaningful change.  
In their review of government regulation of individual and business behavior 
through transparency programs, Fung et al (2009) refer to an action cycle. This cycle 
involves the disclosure of information, the processing of that information by users 
which causes the users to develop perceptions of the discloser, the integration of that 
information into the users’ decision-making process and resulting change in behavior, 
the disclosers’ change in behavior in response to the users’ actions, and then a new 
round of disclosure showing the disclosers’ new behaviors. As applied to sustainabil-
ity reports, this action cycle helps us see where breakdowns can occur. For example, 
the transition in the cycle from corporate disclosure to the processing of that infor-
mation by users requires a suitable standard for sustainability reports for corporations 
to follow, complete disclosure against the indicators included in the standard, the as-
surance of the accuracy of the information contained in the reports, and the presenta-
tion of the information in a format that allows end users to understand and process the 
information. In our current system, this cycle is likely broken, as most of the evidence 




This chapter considers the sustainability reporting action cycle by examining 
the actors involved in making the cycle work. Through this examination, we can de-
velop a better understanding of what policy interventions are needed to make sustain-
ability reporting an effective regulatory mechanism. This chapter proceeds by discuss-
ing how sustainability reporting can function as a regulatory mechanism, and then 
discusses the actors involved, including the corporations that produce reports, the de-
velopers of reporting standards, consulting and assurance providers, intermediary 
groups that process the information in reports for end users, and the end users. 
 
Sustainability Reporting as a Regulatory Mechanism 
When considering the role of sustainability reports, and transparency initiatives in 
general, it is important to consider how they are supposed to function to achieve their 
goals. Regulatory initiatives based on transparency fit well into New Governance reg-
ulatory approaches (or meta-regulation, and other similar categorizations) (Hess, 
2007). Under these approaches, corporations are given a significant amount of free-
dom to develop their own ways of reaching a particular goal. Thus, this regulatory ap-
proach may be viewed as government regulation of self-regulation (Parker, 2007). 
The approach is most useful in situations, such as corporate sustainability, where 
our understanding of the exact regulatory goal is unclear and the means the regulated 
entity should use to achieve those goals are also unclear (Hess 2006). Due to these 
means and ends challenges, New Governance approaches focus on problem-solving, 
decentralization, and broad participation from a variety of stakeholders (with different 
perspectives and areas of expertise). With the government playing a role of “orches-
trator” (as opposed to standard setter), this approach encourages the corporation to 
experiment on solutions, and stakeholders to both provide guidance and hold the cor-
poration accountable. Through this experimentation and engagement, the actors at-
tempt to find the best solution for the issue or organization at hand (taking into ac-
count the relevant unique aspects of the situation), find best practices that can be used 
for other organizations, and seek continual improvement (Hess 2007). 
From this brief description, it is easy to see how transparency through non-
financial reporting can be classified as a form of New Governance regulation. In prior 
work (Hess, 2008), I have described three basic pillars that are necessary for transpar-
ency to function effectively as a New Governance method. They are: disclosure, dia-
logue, and development. Disclosure is the publication of information on how the cor-
poration manages issues related to sustainability and its performance against various 
indicators. As with any disclosure-based regulation, the information allows stakehold-
ers to hold the corporation accountable. In addition, the information can be used for 
other purposes, such as the spreading of best practices and examination of the need 
for other policy interventions.  
The second pillar is dialogue. Dialogue is the engagement with the corporation’s 
stakeholders, both during the creation of the report (to determine which issues are of 
most importance to the stakeholders and ensure the corporation understands evolving 
societal expectations) and over the information in the report. This includes dialogue 
with NGOs, consumer groups, investors, and others. The third pillar is development, 
which refers to the moral development of the corporation as seen through changes in 
management policies and systems, strategy, operations, and corporate culture. Devel-
opment ensures that corporations are thinking “critically, creatively, and continually” 
(Orts, 1995, p. 750) about sustainability, and then implementing changes designed to 
improve their performance. 
 With these regulatory goals in-mind, we now take a look at the sustainability re-
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porting system and its action cycle, as it currently exists. To do this, we look at each 
major actor separately, including: the corporations that produce sustainability reports, 
the organizations that are making the standards for what a sustainability report should 
include, the consulting and accounting organizations that provide services to corpora-
tions producing reports, the intermediaries that process the disclosed information and 
make it available for other to use, and finally the users, which includes those that di-
rectly consume sustainability reports and those that utilize the information through in-
termediaries. 
 
The Sustainability Reporting System 
Corporations 
The action cycle of sustainability reporting begins with the disclosure of infor-
mation by corporations on how they manage issues of sustainability and their perfor-
mance against certain metrics. Thus, the initial question is how to get corporations to 
provide disclosure? In most countries, sustainability reporting is primarily voluntary, 
which raises the question of why corporations produce such reports knowing that 
stakeholders may use the information to criticize the corporation’s performance and 
demand changes.  
Many researchers studying why corporations issue sustainability reports find that 
legitimacy theory provides the explanation. These studies show that corporations are 
motivated by attempts to maintain legitimacy with its stakeholders. Corporations 
viewed by important stakeholders as acting against societal norms on sustainability 
will lose legitimacy, so they must find ways to demonstrate (or create the perception) 
that they are socially responsible. Thus, research has found that corporations that op-
erate in industries with significant sustainability concerns and corporations that have 
recently undergone a negative incident are all more likely to disclose information on 
their performance on sustainability matters (for reviews, see Comyns et al, 2013; 
Hahn et al, forthcoming). This is also consistent with studies showing that corpora-
tions adopt certain corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices as a form of insur-
ance against future negative events (Minor & Morgan 2011; Peloza 2006).  
 Not surprisingly, these disclosures are then focused almost exclusively on posi-
tive information. What is surprising, however, is that these symbolic actions (as op-
posed to true commitments to transparency) seem to work. That is, the other actors in 
the sustainability reporting organizational field seem to reward disclosures of any 
quality. For example, Bansal and Clelland (2004), show that firms with low levels of 
legitimacy with respect to the environment (as seen through negative press coverage) 
are able to reduce their unsystematic stock market risk by simply using communica-
tions that do no more than just express the company’s environmental commitment.  
Supporting this acceptance of symbolic actions are those organizations in the CSR 
field that rank corporations on the quantity of their disclosures (i.e., the number of in-
dicators reported against), and not the actual performance of the company. Thus, 
simply reporting on more indicators—regardless of whether those disclosures are se-
lective and actually work towards creating a misleading impression of the company’s 
efforts and performance—can allow a corporation to be seen by stakeholders as work-
ing towards sustainable development.  The end result is that readers of sustainability 
reports will learn that corporations have already “arrived” at the end of goal of sus-
tainable development, instead of being on a difficult journey towards that goal, which 




To correct these problems, many commentators suggest some form of mandatory 
sustainability reporting against a standardized form. Thus, as pointed out above, in re-
cent years, the debates have shifted away from whether or not to mandate disclosure, 
and towards how to mandate disclosure. For example, in 2009, the GRI, the leading 
standard setter for sustainability reports since 1999 (described below), moved away 
from a focus on voluntary reports and issued a declaration urging countries to consid-
er adopting mandatory legislation in this area. Until sustainability reporting legislation 
become more thorough and widespread, the GRI organization, interested investors, 
and others, have to rely on the “business case” to convince corporations to produce 
reports. The weight of the existing evidence, however, shows that the business case 
simply leads to selective and strategic disclosure designed to protect the corporation’s 
legitimacy. Even if the trends toward mandatory reporting continue, many questions 
remain on how to create a system around sustainability reports that creates a success-
ful action cycle.  
 
Standard Setters 
Sustainability reporting standards provide guidance to corporations on how to 
structure a sustainability report and what indicators to report against in the report. 
These standards seek to ensure that reports produce a complete and accurate picture of 
a corporation’s efforts and performance, and that they meet various stakeholders’ in-
formation needs, including allowing the stakeholders to compare the performance of 
various corporations.  
Today, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is the most well-known and 
widely used standard for the development of sustainability reports. New competition 
continues to emerge, however. The two major competitors that have appeared in the 
last few years are the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the In-
ternational Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC).  The main difference between these 
organizations is that the GRI was established to make corporations accountable to all 
of its stakeholders. The SASB and the IIRC, by contrast, have investors as their pri-
mary audience. 
The GRI is a multi-stakeholder organization and seeks to use a governance 
model that ensures it represents the views of all sectors of society, and not just busi-
ness and investors. Its reporting guidelines have evolved over time and in 2013 it re-
leased its fourth version of reporting guidelines, the G4. The G4 focuses on corpora-
tions disclosing “material” information, which it defines as information “that reflect 
the organization’s significant economic, environmental and social impacts; or sub-
stantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders” (Global Reporting 
Initiative 2013a, p.  7) To determine what is relevant and material for that corporation, 
the G4 requires corporations to consider impacts outside its legal organizational 
boundaries, such as its supply chain. These impacts may be “direct or indirect for 
some topics or as caused by, contributed to, or linked to the organization for others” 
(Global Reporting Initiative 2013b, p. 34). In addition, a corporation is required to 
engage with its stakeholders—and disclose how it identified its stakeholders and en-
gaged with them—to determine what issues are of importance to them and should be 
discussed in the report.  
By contrast, the IIRC and SASB focus on investors. The IIRC focuses on “in-
tegrated reporting,” which is combining financial reports with sustainability reports 
into one report, as opposed to having a standalone sustainability report. The idea of an 
integrated report is that by combining financial and non-financial reports, it will en-
courage corporations to embed sustainability throughout the organization (and assist 
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in that process) (Eccles & Krzus, 2010). The IIRC’s version of integrated reporting is 
focused on helping investors identify those social and environmental issues that are 
material from an investor’s perspective.
1
 The IIRC’s approach is focused on creating 
the “business case” for the consideration of environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) issues, which it believes will cause managers within the corporation to take 
these issues more seriously and then seek to improve performance (IIRC 2013b). 
The SASB has the most limited goal, as it is focused only on improving dis-
closures in a corporation’s annual report on matters material to its investors. The 
SASB describes itself as “engaged in the creation and dissemination of sustainability 
accounting standards for use by publicly-listed corporations in disclosing material 
sustainability issues for the benefit of investors and the public” (SASB 2013a). The 
SASB states that the SASB and IIRC are both focused on investors as their audience, 
while the GRI is focused on all stakeholders (SASB 2013b). By using a process of 
materiality mapping, the SASB begins with forty different sustainability issues and 
examines their relevance for each industry. Their goal is to produce stand-alone 
standards for each industry (over eighty in all) that show what issues are “material” 
for investors (under United States law) and therefore should be disclosed in annual 
reports. Once the SASB has completed this process for each industry—releasing in-
dustry standards separately as they are completed—they plan to work to obtain formal 
approval of their standards by the SEC. To work towards this goal, SASB seeks to on-
ly use indictors that it believes will be auditable (SASB 2013c). By contrast, the GRI 
seeks to provide greater accountability to all stakeholders through a larger number of 
required disclosures. 
These three standards provide three different models for corporations to follow 
in producing sustainability reports, as well as three different models for mandatory 
requirements from governments. This raises the question of whether the developers of 
these standards are competitors for users. As corporations feel greater pressure to pro-
duce sustainability reports–due to concerns of mandatory reporting requirements and 
greater pressure from investors and NGOs–there is the potential for a “race to the bot-
tom” where corporations seek to adopt the most lenient standard and the standards 
setters compete to provide that standard. For instance, for the IIRC to be successful, it 
has to convince corporations of the “business case” for reporting. The SASB must 
convince corporations and investors of its value, both for voluntary adoption and, ul-
timately, to seek SEC approval. The end result may be that the standard that requires 
the least amount of information and gives the corporation the greatest ability to selec-
tively and strategically disclose will dominate. There is some evidence that this is 
happening. Based on her observations and interviews with GRI officials, Sarfaty 
(2013) argues that the “GRI is no longer aimed at empowering its original audience 
[communities, consumers, NGOs, and social investors] to hold corporations account-
able,” (Sarfaty, 2013, p. 607) but instead its primary audience is corporations in order 
to increase the use of their reporting standards. Levy and colleagues state it more 
starkly: the GRI standard setters took “efforts to shape GRI as complementary to cor-
porate and financial market needs. The strategic risk, of course, is that GRI would be 
co-opted and assimilated within these structures rather than transforming them. This 
does appear to be the emerging outcome.” (Levy et al, 2010, p. 111). 
On the other hand, sustainability reporting could evolve in the opposite direc-
tion. That is, the SASB approach—which has the most limited goal—may actually 
lead to greater acceptance and adoption of broader sustainability reporting in the long 
term. Under this perspective, if corporations adopt (either voluntarily or through SEC 
mandate) the SASB guidelines for annual report disclosures, then the legitimacy of 
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non-financial reporting in general increases. Over time, this could lead to expanded 
disclosures, as investors gain greater familiarity with using this type of information 
and develop expectations of corporations providing it. This assumes that SASB stand-
ards do not become so watered-down through a SEC review process as to provide on-
ly very limited information to markets, which could then significantly impede pro-
gress due to the lack of usefulness of the information provided. 
As the SASB develops, it also suggests a different route for transparency ad-
vocates. That is, pushes for mandatory disclosure from those representing non-
shareholder stakeholders could focus on matters that fall outside the investor material-
ity standard. One example may be the Dodd-Frank Act’s adoption of requirements 
that match the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). These could be is-
sue-by-issue pushes for mandatory disclosure requirements, as opposed to reports that 
seek to push corporations to conduct a holistic review of their operations. Standards 
such as the GRI could then evolve to focus on how corporations can pull all of this in-
formation from various legal requirements (those focused on investor needs and those 
focused on targeted issues) together into one report, with the additional goal of requir-
ing corporations to understand how these issues fit together in operational and strate-
gic decisions. 
 
Consulting and Assurance Services 
Regardless of which standard a corporation chooses (or is required) to use, it will 
likely need assistance from consultants to create the report and from auditors to pro-
vide verification services for those reports. Not surprisingly, one commentator argues 
that these consultants and assurance providers “derive more economic benefit from 
the GRI than any other stakeholder” (Sarfaty, 2013, p. 609; see also Levy et al, 2010). 
These organizations provide a wide variety of services to corporations related to non-
financial disclosure, such as: 
• how to engage stakeholders  
• the provision of data management services 
• how to structure the report and communicate the company’s vision and perfor-
mance more generally 
• assurance services for part, or all, of the sustainability report 
• how to use the sustainability report within a broader CSR strategy for risk man-
agement 
As any one organization may provide all of these services as well as others to cor-
porations, there are many potential conflicts of interest. For example, there is a con-
cern that in an effort to please their clients (corporations that are purchasing a wide 
variety of services from accounting firms and not just services related to sustainability 
reporting), the accounting firms may overlook disclosures that are technically accu-
rate but do not represent a complete picture of the corporation’s performance on that 
issue (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2007). Some commentators have also expressed the con-
cern that these accounting and consulting firms unduly dominate the setting of stand-
ards, such as the GRI, and their conflicts of interest challenge the legitimacy of the re-
sulting standards (Sarfaty, 2013). Apart from conflicts of interest, some have 
challenged the expertise of many of these organizations to provide verification ser-
vices (i.e., accounting expertise versus sustainability expertise).  
 
Intermediaries 
The end users of the information contained in sustainability reports are not neces-
sarily readers of sustainability reports. Instead, they may use information from sus-
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tainability reports that is provided to them through information intermediaries. These 
intermediaries provide many services to end users, such as transforming the infor-
mation into a format that is easier and more understandable for the end user, provid-
ing the end user with only the information they care most about, comparing the per-
formance of multiple corporations, measuring a company’s progress over time, 
supplementing the information from sustainability reports with other sources of in-
formation (both public and proprietary), monitoring the credibility of the information 
contained in sustainability reports, and other services (Hess 2007). 
For example, Thomson Reuters’ Asset4 database claims to provide ESG data on 
over 4,000 global companies, with over 120 analysts collecting information from sus-
tainability reports and other information sources (Thomson Reuters 2013). The in-
tended audience for the data is institutional investors, investment managers, and ana-
lysts. MSCI ESG Research provides a similar service, with different products meeting 
different needs. For example, if an investor wants to minimize the risk of investing in 
a company that will suffer from reputational risk, MSCI’s Impact Monitor database 
will rank companies based on their performance against soft law mechanisms such as 
the UN Global Compact (MSCI 2013a). MSCI also provides products designed for 
investors that want to negatively screen companies that do not meet the investors’ eth-
ical standards, as well as products for investors that use positive screening (investing 
in those companies with the highest ESG performance in their industry) (MSCI 
2013b).  
Sustainability investment indexes may also be viewed as intermediaries. Indexes 
such as the FTSE4Good and the Dow Jones Sustainability Indices, combine infor-
mation from sustainability reports with other data sources (including proprietary data 
collected through surveys), and then decide whether to include a company in a partic-
ular index. Investors may then choose to use one of these indices as a way of practic-
ing sustainable investing (RobecoSAM 2013; FTSE 2013).  
Another group of intermediaries would be those that publish rankings of corpora-
tions on certain dimensions. The Newsweek Green Rankings is one well-known ex-
ample. These organizations that rank companies creates a market for one group of in-
termediaries to sell data to another group of intermediaries. For example, Trucost 
collects information on environmental data, which is then sold to companies, inves-
tors, and researchers, including Newsweek (Trucost 2012). 
 In most of these examples of intermediaries, the intermediary is funded by the 
organization (typically investors) that purchase the products. This has the advantage 
of avoiding the conflicts of interest that existed in the subprime mortgage market 
where the credit rating agencies were funded by the organizations whose products 
they were rating.  However, because the investor community is the largest intermedi-
ary group, it also means that the push for corporations to produce more and better da-
ta, or to use particular standards, is biased by the needs of that community. The inter-
ests of other stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, and special interest groups, 
are not represented, unless filtered through investors. Thus, there is the question of 
whether this bias is problematic –resulting in sustainability reports that only provide 
information that is “material” for investors—or if investors are able to work with 
NGOs and others to ensure that corporations are producing sufficient information to 
be held accountable to all stakeholders.  For example, the anti-corruption NGO 
Transparency International has worked with investor groups to push for greater dis-
closure on corporation’s anti-bribery efforts, and they have taken considerable effort 
to ensure that those disclosures work towards a transparency initiative that meets the 




 Who uses sustainability reports? That appears to be an open question. Sustain-
ability reports are becoming institutionalized as a feature of a socially responsible 
corporation, but the value of the reports to users is not well understood. There are 
claims that NGOs—initially envisioned as the user of reports in their civil regulator 
role—do not use the reports because they do not contain sufficiently useful infor-
mation (either to fully understand a corporation’s actions, policies, and performance, 
or to compare performance across companies). Intermediaries, such as those described 
above, use the information to some degree, but they supplement it with additional in-
formation (including their own proprietary surveys of corporations). Thus, it is un-
clear how much they value the information in the reports. 
Of course, other stakeholders may use the information in ways that do not fol-
low the action cycle described above of end users creating incentives for disclosers to 
improve their behavior. For example, industry competitors may use the information to 
improve their own performance (i.e., learning). As another example, the management 
team of the discloser may use the process of creating the report to improve operations 
and to build a company culture that values sustainability. Despite the growth of sus-
tainability reporting, there is little research on how (and if) different stakeholder 
groups use the reports. 
 
Discussion 
The assumption behind transparency initiatives is that disclosure will lead to 
corporations engaging in some form of a dialogue with stakeholders (ranging from 
constructively suggesting better practices to shaming practices), which will then cause 
the corporations to make internal changes (development), so they can produce more 
favorable disclosures in future reporting cycles. Considering all the actors involved 
and their incentives, there are questions on the accuracy of that model and what can 
be done to improve the system as we move forward. For example, do we need one 
sustainability reporting standard to attempt to achieve all of these goals? Or, is there 
room for multiple, complementary standards? In other words, are the IIRC, SASB and 
GRI competitors, or complements? And, if complements, how does that impact how 
these standards should evolve and the role of government? 
Under the current model of voluntary GRI reports, most research seems to 
support the conclusion that sustainability reports have their greatest focus on risk 
management and protecting the company’s reputation. This is consistent with broader 
concerns about using CSR strategically: 
By increasingly focusing on strategic forms of CSR activity, MNCs are 
moving away from a societal understanding of CSR that focuses on 
redressing the impacts of their operations through stakeholder 
concerns, back to any activity that supports traditional business 
imperatives. (Bondy et al, 2012). 
  
The standard response to these concerns is the need for mandatory reporting using 
standardized indicators and independent verification of the information (and often, re-
quired engagement with stakeholders). However, as seen above, the assessment of the 
potential effectiveness of such a system requires consideration of the current actors in 
the organizational field surrounding sustainability reports and this raises many ques-
tions. 
What type of standards should be mandated? Should the standards be more similar 
to the SASB which is focused on the disclosure pillar, and primarily the needs of in-
vestors? Or, the GRI standards which emphasize dialogue (stakeholder engagement) 
and development? Are these current standards compliments or competitors? Should 
each push for their standard to be mandatory, or find some other approach?  
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Answering these questions requires additional, in-depth research on the actors de-
scribed in this chapter. As just one example, additional research is needed on the in-
fluence of different departments and officers within the firm on the sustainability re-
porting process. For example, consider if the legal department, the communications 
department, and the sustainability officer each separately developed a sustainability 
report for the same corporation, and how different each of those three reports would 
be. This thought experiment may influence how we want the government to become 
involved. For example, it may be best for the GRI if the government made a SASB-
type standard mandatory (which would involve the legal department, but the standards 
are written to be auditable and may not be significantly affected by significant legal 
department oversight), and found other ways to incentivize corporations to create sus-
tainability officer positions (and/or sustainability committees on boards of directors). 
Sustainability officers are more likely committed to the principles of disclosure, dia-
logue, and development, and may seek to produce GRI-type reports to supplement 
any mandatory reporting for investors. Thus, the GRI may be better served by getting 
its standards adopted in practice through this indirect route rather than through gov-
ernment mandated adoption of the GRI standards.  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter encourages academics, policy makers, and others, to consider 
more fully the system required for sustainability reporting to have a meaningful, posi-
tive impact on corporate behavior. In short, we need to remember two things. First, 
transparency is not an end in itself. Any transparency-based policy initiative designed 
to improve the performance of corporations with respect to issues of sustainability 
must be based on a clear understanding of how the required disclosures will lead to 
improved performance. The New Governance approach to regulation, and the pillars 
of disclosure, dialogue, and development, provide one way to think through those is-
sues. Second, when considering mandated disclosure of sustainability reports, we 
must be sure to consider how those reports will be used in practice. There needs to be 
a clear understanding of how we expect the action cycle to work, where the potential 
breakdown points of the cycle are located due to various actors’ incentives, and how 
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broad and longer-term consequences of the decisions organizations make, based on a wide range of factors, 
in order to create value over time. 
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